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The increasing number of satellites in orbit and the upcoming deployment of constellations of hundreds of 
small satellites raises the problem of orbital debris and saturation of main LEO and GEO orbits. Currently, about 
sixty percent of satellites are deorbited at their end of life, including thirty percent deliberately with a propulsion 
system. The increase in the number of debris has led to the implementation of preventive and corrective actions at 
an international level to ensure the availability and safety of these orbits for future space projects. It therefore 
appears necessary to guarantee with the best estimate possible the operations of passivation and withdrawal of 
service for satellites in orbit at their end of life. 
This paper presents and illustrates  with the case of the French National Space Agency’s scientific satellite 
TARANIS based on the Myriade microsatellite generic platform  different approaches to improve satellite 
reliability model. They are based on Bayesian and Chi-Square techniques that rely on operations feedback in order 
to provide a more realistic risk assessment, closer to the value statistically observed in orbit. 
This will lead to a better compliance to space debris national and international standards  as the French Law 
on Space Operations or the ISO Space Systems - Space Debris Mitigation Requirements  concerning end-of-life 
operations. That way, it will guarantee a safe access and operations in space for future missions by limiting the 




AOCS = Attitude and Orbit Control System 
CAD = Computer-Aided Design 
CTA = Active Thermal Control 
EEE = Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical 
FIT = Failure In Time 
FR = Failure Rate 
GS = Solar Generator 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
LOS = French Law on Space Operations 
MAG = Magnetometer 
MEGS = Solar Generator drive Mechanism 
MTB = Magneto Torquer Bar 
MTTF = Mean Time To Failure 
OBC = On Board Computer 
PCDU = Power Conditioning and Distribution Unit 
P/F = Platform 
RW = Reaction Wheel 
SST = Standard Star Tracker 
REX = Experience feedback 
RX = Receiver 
R&T = Research and Technology 
SAS = Sun Analog Sensor 
SPOF = Single Point Of Failure 
TX = Transmitter 
 







In the last few years, with the constantly increasing 
number of space debris  especially in LEO  and after 
recent in orbit collisions between active and defunct 
satellites, several international organizations of big 
space nations have established standards to encourage 
global efforts to deal with this issue. They require, 
among others: 
- To avoid the release of Mission Related Objects 
into Earth orbit during the operations; 
- To avoid break-ups in Earth orbits during 
operations and after the end of the mission by 
passivating all the sources of energy stored on 
board; 
- To remove spacecraft and launch vehicles orbital 
stages from the LEO through a controlled re-entry 
or an uncontrolled one within 25 years, and GEO 
protected regions through maneuvers to a higher 
orbit of about 200km; 
- To perform the necessary actions to minimize the 
risk of collision with other space objects.  
 
In this context, the probability of successful service 
withdrawal is a major requirement.  
It directly determines the long-term evolution of the 
debris population in flight: all the simulations carried 
out by the agencies as part of the IADC (Inter-Agency 
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Space Debris Coordination Committee) studies were 
carried out with a success rate set at 90% (percentage 
of satellite withdraw versus population of end-of-life 
satellites). 
It also determines the criteria for deorbitation at the end 
of the mission with regard to the events (anomalies, 
breakdowns, etc.) experienced by the satellite. 
 
 
II. SATELLITE END-OF-LIFE OPERATIONS 
 
1. Withdrawal from Service 
 
The value currently set by the 2017 Technical 
Regulations for probability of success of carrying out 
the withdrawal operations is 0.85. 
Internationally, in ISO 24113:2019, the absolute 
probability of successful withdrawal is 0.90. 
 
The probability of 0.85 does not include the 
availability of consumable energy resources which is 
the subject of another clause.  
The service withdrawal manoeuvers include the 
following steps: 
 
1. Satellite deorbitation/re-orbitation to free the LEO 
and GEO most used orbits: 
- If the implementation is done in protected 
geosynchronous (GEO) regions: the satellite 
withdrawal operations must be such that it cannot 
return to the protected area naturally within 100 
years. 
- If the implementation is in the protected Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO): the satellite withdrawal 
operations must be such that it must no longer be 
present in LEO orbit within 25 years after the end 
of the mission. The satellites are designed to carry 
out an atmospheric reentry within 25 years after 
their end of operational life. 
 
2. The fluid passivation of the satellite: It 
corresponds to the emptying of the propellants and 
to the depressurization of all the pressurized 
systems present in the satellite, such as the 
chemical propulsion systems and plasma too. At 
the end of the fluid passivation, the resulting 
pressure must not exceed a few bars (in 
concordance with the technical regulations). 
 
3. The electric passivation of the satellite: It 
corresponds to the definitive de-energization of all 
systems and equipment of the satellite which 
could either present risk for the integrity of the 
satellite or disturb other orbital objects. This 
includes: 
- The shutdown and isolation of all actuators 
(AOCS) such as reaction wheels or 
gyroscopic actuators. 
- The shutdown of all equipment capable of 
transmitting (RF). 
- Disconnection and isolation of the battery and 
of all other sources of electricity generation 
(solar generator for example). 
 
In summary, the probability of successful withdrawal 
of service is considered to be the reliability of the 
satellite resources necessary for withdrawal of service 
under the conditions specified previously. 
 
This study is generally done in interface with the 
system engineers and electrical and propulsion 
architects of the project in order to identify the 
minimum architecture necessary to carry out the end of 
life operations of the satellite. 
The main difficulty of the study is to have access to the 
failure rates of the equipment necessary for these 
operations. Therefore, it is needed to anticipate the 
end-of-life probability success calculation from the 
preliminary design stages, by choosing components 
and equipment for which the suppliers have carried out 
reliability studies, tests or have already flown long 
enough. As a last resort, it is also possible to make 
relevant and justified analogies - based on expert 
judgment - with equipment from satellites that have 
already flown. 
 
2. Evaluation of the Satellite Reliability 
 
This part presents the methodology to evaluate the 
satellite reliability  needed to calculate the probability 
of successful end-of-life operations  with the highest 
precision possible thanks to various mathematical 
models. 
 
a. Theoretical Reliability 
 
The theoretical reliability assessment of a satellite is 
based on the following hypotheses: 
 
- During the mission, the components are assumed 
to have constant failure rates (λ), and to be able to 
fail independently of each other. 
- The exponential law is used to calculate the 
reliability (R) according to the formulas 1, 2 and 
3: 
 
o For a single point of failure: 
 
𝑅 =  𝑒 ∗                 (1)  
                 
o For active redundancy: 
𝑅 (𝑚/𝑛) = 𝐶 (1 − 𝑒 ∗ ) ∗  (𝑒 ∗ )  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐶 =  
!
!( )!
                                                 (2) 
 
o For passive redundancy: 
𝑅 (𝑚 𝑛⁄ ) = 𝑒 ∗ ∗ 1 +
(1 − 𝑒 ∗ )
𝑖!





           (3) 
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- The failure rate of elements that are not in 
operation (𝜆 ) is assumed to be 1/10 of the 
failure rate (𝜆 ) for EEE components. 
- For equipment with a duty cycle (α) other than 
100%, an equivalent failure rate is calculated 
using the formula 4: 
𝜆 = 𝛼 ∗ 𝜆 + (1 − 𝛼) ∗ 𝜆             (4) 
 
However, the results of this method are always very 
pessimistic regarding with the real performances of the 
satellites. Indeed, the main source of uncertainty of the 
method comes from the MIL-HDBK-217 standard 
which is the most widely used empirical reliability 
prediction model for electronic equipment.  
This military handbook was developed in 1961 with 
the purpose of establishing and maintaining consistent 
and uniform methods to estimate the inherent 
reliability of military electronic equipment and 
systems. 
However, it is not updated since 1995, and incomplete 
since new components, technologies and quality 
improvements are not covered. As a result, actual in-
orbit performance has often showed largely 
conservative results leading to potential overdesign, 
reduced performance and cost effectiveness of satellite 
design. 
Some R&T had been conducted by the French agency 
and Space industrials  Airbus Defence and Space and 
Thales Alenia Space  in order to update and revitalize 
the MIL-HDBK-217 standard in recent years and a 
Reliability models extensions User Guide has been 
published. However, the handbook remains quite 
pessimistic even with this update. 
 
b. REX and Bayesian Techniques 
 
A forecast estimate of equipment reliability can be 
consolidated by taking into account the effective 
operating life of identical equipment, operating since 
its launch in similar environments and conditions of 
use (including temperature), by application of 
Bayesian techniques  as illustrated on Figure 1 : 
 
 
Figure 1: Principle of Bayesian inference 
 
The reliability is characterized by a Poisson 
distribution, i.e. the probability of obtaining k failures 
during a cumulative time T is proportional to: 
 
𝑓(𝑘 / 𝜆, 𝑇) =
( )
!
𝑒             (5) 
 
with λ the failure rate (the unknown parameter to 
estimate). 
In our case, we have “a priori” information: the 
theoretical reliability estimate. These assessments are 
considered to be performed at 60% confidence. By 
considering this theoretical failure rate no longer as a 
simple value but as a random variable, it is possible to 
consider a law "a priori". 
 
For a Poisson distribution, it is possible to consider a 
law “a priori” Gamma, which is the conjugate of the 
Poisson law: 





                  (6) 
 
The formula 6 can also be expressed by formula 7, i.e. 
a Gamma law with parameters 𝛼 = 𝑘 + 1 and 𝛽 = 𝑇, 
because Γ(k+1) = k!: 
 
𝑔(𝜆 / 𝛼, 𝛽)  =  
Γ( )
                  (7) 
 
 
The scale parameter 𝛽 is then equal to 𝛼/𝜆 because 
𝐸(𝜆) = 𝛼/𝛽 and the shape parameter α can be 
calculated by solving the equation of formula 8 for a 
level of confidence of n%: 
 
𝐹 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝑛%, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝛼/𝛽             (8) 
 
 
α = 1.765156924 for a 60% confidence level of the 
estimation. 
 
The a priori law can be enriched by REX data (k 
failures during a cumulative period T) and lead to the 
“a posteriori” distribution of formula 9.  
 
𝑔(𝜆/𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑘, 𝑇) =  
( )
( )
 =  𝛤(𝛽 + 𝑇, 𝛼 + 𝑘)     
(9) 
 
The point estimator of the λbayesian failure rate is the 
average value of the Gamma distribution “a 
posteriori”. 
 
𝜆 =     (10) 
 
where k = number of failures; T = total operating time 
in hours. 
 
In this way the Formula 10 permits to combine a 
theoretical reliability with operation results of similar 
equipment in order to consolidate the satellite 
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reliability  as shown for the case of TARANIS in 
Chapter III. 
 
c. REX and Chi-Square Method 
 
Another classic approach to compute the failure rates 
of one unit from the REX, test or in orbit data, is the 
Chi-Square distribution. When assuming that the life 
of the device follows an exponential law with constant 
failure rate (λ) and that failures are independent, the 
statistic “twice the total test time T divided by the mean 
life (θ = 1/λ)” is distributed as a Chi-Square χ² (α, n) 






   (11) 
 
where T = Total operating time in hours; 1 − 𝛼 = 
Confidence and k = Number of failures. 
 
And so the estimator of the failure rate is defined by 
the formula 12:  
 
𝜆 =






This model is useful when a lot of equipment’s 
operating data is available  for satellite constellations 
using the same platform for example. When the total 
operating time is small, the estimation is very 
pessimistic and not reflecting the reality. This method 
will also be illustrated in the next chapter with the 




III. TARANIS END-OF-LIFE OPERATIONS 
 
1. Satellite Presentation 
 
TARANIS (Tool for the Analysis of RAdiation from 
lightNIng and Sprites) is an observation microsatellite 
of the French Space Agency CNES which will study 
the transient luminous events that form over the clouds 
during thunderstorms around the globe.  
The TARANIS mission is dedicated to study the 
magnetosphere-ionosphere-atmosphere coupling via 
transient processes. 
The TARANIS satellite will observe all the emissions 
above thunderstorm and will allow to simultaneously 
measure: 
- Transient Luminous Events (TLEs) 
- Terrestrial Gamma-ray Flashes (TGFs) 
- Electric and Magnetic emissions, 
- Runaways electrons beams. 
 
 
Figure 2: Transient luminous events observed by 
TARANIS 
 
The satellite will be launched this year (end of 2020) 
on a sun-synchronous orbit at an altitude of 700 
kilometers. 
 
The reliability of the functions necessary for 
TARANIS end of life operations must be better than 
0.85 at the end of the mission duration.  
This TARANIS mission duration in orbit is 62 months 
(5 years and 2 months) counted as follows: 
 
- Satellite Launch and Early Orbit Phase and fine 
positioning: 0.5 month; 
- In-flight commissioning: 2.5 months; 
- Routine phase: 45.0 months; 
- Mission extension: 12.0 months; 
- Disposal phase: 2.0 months. 
 
2. Satellite Architecture 
 
The TARANIS satellite is associating a Myriade 




Figure 3: TARANIS CAD model 
 
a. Scientific Payload 
 
The TARANIS scientific payload is constituted by the 
instruments: 
- MCP, a set of 2 cameras and 3 photometers 
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- XGRE, a set of 3 detectors to measure high energy 
photons (20 keV to 10 MeV) and relativistic electrons 
(1 MeV to 10 MeV); 
- IDEE, a set of 2 electron detectors to measure their 
spectrum between 70 keV to 4 MeV together with their 
pitch angle; 
- IME-BF, a low frequency antenna to measure the 
electric field to a frequency up to 3.3 MHz; 
- IME-HF, a high frequency antenna to measure the 
electric field at frequencies of 100 kHz to 30 MHz; 
- IMM, a tri-axis magnetometer to measure the 
magnetic field. 
 
b. Myriade Platform 
 
The TARANIS platform is based on the Myriade 
Microsatellites Series recurrent product line, using a 
new “200kg” structure. It includes the support 
functions for in flight operations as provision of 
electrical power, command and data handling, 
telecommunications, thermal control and propulsion 
for orbit maneuvers: 
 
- Propulsion system 
- GS panels 
- MEGS 
- Battery 
- On Board Computer 
- Magnetometer 
- Sun Analog Sensors  
- Reaction Wheels 
- Stellar Sensor 
- Gyrometers 
- S-band transmitters (in passive redundancy ½) 
- S-band receivers (in active redundancy ½)  
- S-band antenna 
- X-band transmitter and antenna 
- Active Thermal Control 
 
3. Presentation of the Problematic 
 
At the end of the TARANIS mission, the satellite will 
be deorbited and then passived.  
In this case the desorbitation consists in lowering the 
orbit altitude of the satellite, allowing it to enter the 
atmosphere in less than 25 years. 
In order to be able to perform these desorbiting 
maneuvers: 
- The Payload and interface circuits on the Platform 
side are not necessary; 
- The resources allocated to the Payload will allow us 
to consider additional redundancies for the Solar 
Generator; 
- All other satellite functions and equipment are 
required. 
 
The fluid passivation is ensured by a procedure 
allowing the emptying of the propellant which does not 
differ from the nominal procedures. 
The electrical passivation is ensured by a discharge of 
the battery, an orientation of the GS back to the sun and 
an opening of the GS sections. 
 
The probability of success of the satellite end-of-life 
operations is the reliability of the system previously 
identified composed by all the required equipment to 
perform these operations. 
 
4. Theoretical Reliability of the Satellite 
 
For platform equipment the development was largely 
based on equipment purchased "off the shelf”, for 
which the directives given to equipment manufacturers 
were to deliver for information  when it existed  the 
reliability documentation available from previous 
programs. 
 
Thus, the failure rates of the equipment considered in 
Table 1 come either from supplier data or from analogy 
with other programs. 
 




With these data and using Formulas 1, 2 and 3, the 
following results are obtained concerning the 
theoretical reliability of the TARANIS platform 
(without and with the one-year mission extension): 
 
P/F Reliability (for LOS) 
@ 4 years and 2 months @ 5 years et 2 months 
0.68 0.62 
 
These numbers are very pessimistic in comparison 
with the results of previous missions based on a 
Myriade Platform and are not enough to respect the 






Use rate Quantity  
Avionics OBC 1550 100% 1 
Power 
GS 100 100% 1 
PCDU 1175 100% 1 
Battery 110 100% 1 
MEGS 830 100% 1 
TTC 
chain 
Rx 1160 100% 2 
Tx 830 10% 2 
Antennas 204 100% 2 
Diplexer 10 100% 1 
Thermal CTA 300 100% 1 
SCAO 
RW (X, Y1 
et Z) 
1304 100% 3 
RW (Y2) 1304 10% 1 
MAG 412 100% 1 
MTB 7 100% 3 
SAS 15 100% 3 
SST 500 100% 1 
Gyrometer 5815 1% 1 
Propulsion 1524 10% 1 
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5. Bayesian Reliability 
 
The Bayesian method previously defined is used to 
consolidate the theoretical failure rates.  
 
These techniques allow the theoretical values of failure 
rates to be combined with the REX Myriade. 
Thus, the “a priori” failure rate, considered with a level 
of confidence of 60%, constitutes the “a priori” 
knowledge.  
The Myriade REX indicates that the cumulative time 
in operating orbit of the Myriade platforms reaches 31 
years and 4 months (i.e. T = 469,440 hours of 
operation) without failure (k = 0). For equipment in 
several copies, the overall operating time is multiplied 
by their number (taking into account the rate of use). 
Some equipment such as MEGS and SST not being 
present on Myriade “minimal” type platforms, the 
operating time is only 269,000 hours. For Myriade 
Wheels, we find in the REX that the cumulative 
operating time reaches 145 years and 4 months (T = 
1,273,080 h). 
 
Thus, using Formula 6, this recalibration makes it 
possible to obtain much better posterior failure rates: 
 
Table 2: Adjusted reliability data for the  
TARANIS platform 
 
With the new failure rate values recalculated using 
Bayesian techniques, the following values are obtained 
for the Platform reliability using Formulas 1, 2 and 3: 
 
P/F Reliability (for LOS) 
@ 4 years and 2 months @ 5 years et 2 months 
0.76 0.71 
 
The estimation is less pessimist but still not enough to 
respect the specification.  
In order to improve it, it is possible to group all the 
equipment in series to have a less pessimistic estimate 
of the reliability: 
 
Table 3: Adjusted and grouped reliability data for 
the TARANIS platform 
 
where (FR is the Failure Rate in FITS):  
𝐹𝑅     
= 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
+ 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅 + 𝐹𝑅
= 9305 𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 
 
In this case the new results are better: 
 
The specification (0.85) is respected for a 4 years and 
2 months’ nominal mission, without mission 
extension. This method is not enough to demonstrate 
the 0.85 probability with a mission extension of one 
year. 
 
6. Chi-Square Reliability 
 
For a platform with so much REX as Myriade, the most 
efficient way method is the Chi-Square technique, that 
uses only REX and no theoretical values. 
By application of the Formula 12 with T = 269 000 h 
and a confidence level of 60%, it is possible to obtain 
the 𝜆 . The evolution of TARANIS platform 
reliability (an exponential law with parameter 









Avionic OBC 1550 469 440 1100 
Power 
GS 100 469 440 98 
PCDU 1175 469 440 895 
Battery 110 469 440 107 
MEGS 830 269 000 737 
TTC chain 
Rx 1160 938 880 887 
Tx 830 93 888 812 
Antennas 204 938 880 184 
Diplexer 10 469 440 10 
Thermal CTA 300 469 440 278 
SCAO 
RW (X, Y1 
et Z) 
1304 1 273 080 672 
RW (Y2) 1304 1 273 080 672 
MAG 412 469 440 371 
MTB 7 1 408 320 7 
SAS 15 1 408 320 15 
SST 500 269 000 465 
Gyrometer 5815 4694 5727 

















9305 100% 1 269 000 3848 
Battery 110 100% 1 469 440 107 
String GS 100 100% 1 469 440 98 
Rx 1160 100% 2 938 880 887 
Tx 830 2% 2 93 888 812 
P/F Reliability (for LOS) 
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Figure 4: Evolution of TARANIS platform 
reliability in time 
 
For information, the curve of theoretical reliability 
obtained in Chapter IV. 4. and the curve obtained with 
Chi-Square method with one failure are also drawn. 
The curve with one failure would correspond to the 
pessimistic hypothesis that a failure appears 
immediately after the last observation. 
 
With this technique, the reliability is the less 
pessimistic:  
 
P/F Reliability (for LOS) 
@ 4 years and 2 months @ 5 years et 2 months 
0.88 0.86 
 
The Chi-Square technique allowed to demonstrate the 
needed probability of successful TARANIS’ end-of-
life operations  even with the one-year mission 
extension  that was needed to obtain the authorization 





A successful End-of-life disposal and the compliance 
to Space Debris laws and requirements are issue of 
interest and importance for space agencies such as the 
CNES. 
The different approaches presented in the publication 
to overpass uncertainties of the current reliability 
models using experience feedback are expected to lead 
to more realistic figures and therefore to better 
decisions for the need of a disposal or a possible life 
extension for example. 
Being able to dispose a satellite in a safe and reliable 
manner has a fundamental importance in order to limit 
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